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   Powers  and  dispositions  are  all  the  rage  in  contemporary  analytic  metaphysics.i    A  key  
feature  of  the  developing  anti-­‐‑Humean  approach  is  that  it  reverses  the  presumed  direction  of  fit  
between  behavior  and  laws.  From  a  dispositional  realist  perspective,  laws  hold  in  virtue  of  the  
powers  of  given  kinds  of  things  to  effect  given  kinds  of  change,  not  the  other  way  around.    It  is  
not  laws,  but  powers  –  or,  some  would  say,  the  bearers  of  powers  –  that  bring  about  outcomes.    
Dispositional  realism  therefore  lends  itself  to  a  conception  of  causality  as  consisting  in  the  
display  or  expression  of  powers,  rather  than  as  anything  amounting  to  sequences,  or  statements  
about  sequences,  regular  or  not,  counterfactual  or  not.    Finally,  unlike  for  the  Humean,  for  
dispositional  realists  the  relationship  between  what  something  can  potentially  do  and  the  kind  
of  thing  that  it  is,  is  one  of  necessity.    This  is  not  to  say  that  a  thing  must  necessarily  express  its  
powersii  (let  alone  that  the  expression  thereof  will  necessarily  issue  in  an  associated  effectiii),  
only  that  a  thing  of  a  given  kind  bears  the  powers  of  its  kind  necessarily.iv    Jointly,  these  features  
of  dispositional  realism  stand  to  radically  reconfigure  the  debate  in  analytic  philosophy  over  
free  will.    Or  so  I  aim  to  show.    I  begin  by  establishing  what  the  determinism  side  of  the  
contemporary  free  will  problematic  looks  like,  from  a  powers  perspective,  then  do  the  same  for  
a  range  of  issues  associated  with  the  free  will  side.    (To  be  clear,  by  “side”  I  do  not  mean  
adherents  of  one  or  another  position;  I  mean  the  constituent  categories  of  the  conceptual  artifice  
that  is  the  dichotomy  between  Humean-­‐‑inflected  determinism  and  Humean-­‐‑inflected  free  will.    
(Note  also  that  insofar  as  Kant  adheres  to  a  passivist,  nomological  conception  of  causation,  both  
Kantian-­‐‑style  determinism  in  relation  to  phenomena  and  Kantian-­‐‑style  escape  therefrom  count  
as  Humean-­‐‑inflected  for  the  purposes  of  the  present  analysis.)    I  have  made  use  of  the  Hegelian  
term  “sublate.”    To  sublate  is  to  re-­‐‑frame,  such  that  irreconcilable,  apparently  independent  
positions  may  be  shown  to  be  misconceived  elements  of  a  coherent  whole.    The  claim  is  that  a  
dispositional  realist  ontology  can  be  seen  to  sublate  the  terms  of  the  free  will  debate.    (Let  me  
also  be  clear  that  I  do  not  mean  to  argue  that  a  powers  ontology  solves  the  Humean-­‐‑inflected  
problem.    I  mean  to  say  that  it  reconfigures  it,  such  that  it  can  be  seen  to  have  been  ill-­‐‑conceived  
in  the  first  place.)    As  it  happens,  one  consequence  of  the  sublation  is  a  bolstering  of  the  thesis  of  
agent-­‐‑causation.    I  therefore  end  the  paper  by  briefly  cataloguing  the  merits  of  a  dispositional  
realist  version  of  agent-­‐‑causation  as  compared  to  those  of  an  agent-­‐‑causal  view  married  to  an  
otherwise-­‐‑Humean  metaphysics.                            
  
(i)  Powers  and  Determinism  
   The  contemporary  free  will  problematic  does  not  hinge  upon  the  designs  of  God  or  Fate.    
It  presumes  only  that  at  any  given  time  t,  it  is  the  case  that  all  future  states  of  the  world  follow  
necessarily  from  present  conditions  plus  the  laws  of  nature.    Such  a  picture  –  one  of  an  
impersonal  order,  unfolding  inexorably,  all  on  its  own  –  gives  rise  to  a  secular  version  of  the  
contrast  between  the  limited  efficacy  of  mortals  and  the  power  of  God(s)  or  other  supra-­‐‑natural  
agents.    The  question  of  free  will,  in  this  context,  isn’t  so  much  a  question  as  it  is  a  potentially  
horrifying  bit  of  logic:  if  it  is  true  that  all  events  follow  deterministically  from  existing  
conditions  plus  invariant  laws  of  nature,  then,  assuming  the  rule  of  p  or  ~p,  it  cannot  be  the  case  
that  some  do  not.    Those  who  would  reconcile  themselves  to  a  determinism  so  conceived  have  
several  options.    They  can  adopt  a  restricted  sense  of  “free  will”  (so  that  agents  will  still  count  as  
free  even  though  it  is  the  laws  of  nature  that  fix  agents’  desires,  intentions  and  behavior);  they  
can  relax  the  meaning(s)  of  “necessitate,”  “law”  and/or  “cause”  (so  that  an  environment  counts  
as  deterministic  in  virtue  of  being  characterized  by  merely  accidental  regularity);  they  can  do  
both;  or  they  can  accept  with  equanimity  the  implication  that  agents,  being  unable  to  determine  
outcomes,  do  not  have  free  will.    The  first  three  moves  are  associated  with  various  forms  of  
compatibilism,  the  last  with  hard  determinism,  i.e.,  the  thesis  of  determinism  combined  with  
that  of  incompatibilism.    Those  who  are  taken  aback,  meanwhile,  have  the  option  of  
maintaining  (a)  that  free  actions  are  spontaneous,  and  thus  uncaused;  (b)  that  free  actions  are  
indeterministically  caused,  consistent  with  probabilistic  rather  than  deterministic  laws;  (c)  that  
free  actions  involve  what  from  this  perspective  is  taken  to  be  an  entirely  different  kind  of  
causation  than  that  which  applies  to  all  other  events,  viz.,  agent-­‐‑causation.v      
   The  nomological  determinism  that  anchors  the  contemporary  free  will  problematic  
trades  upon  concepts  that  are  of  independent  interest  to  metaphysicians.    And  as  I’ve  noted,  
parties  to  the  debate  are  permitted  to  deploy  different  substantive  accounts  of  these  terms  –  as  
are  philosophers  generally.    For  example,  one  might  have  thought  that  Hume  had  rejected  the  
very  necessity  required  to  motivate  the  problematic  in  the  first  place.    But  Hume  is  regarded  as  
a  classical  compatibilist.    Having  stipulated  that  necessity  means  “expectation  based  upon  a  
customary  experience  of  constant  conjunction,”  he  concludes  that  determinism  entails  only  that  
people  act  according  to  habit.vi    Of  course,  contemporary  Humeans  are  more  likely  to  defend  
accounts  of  causation  according  to  which  regularity  is  analyzed  in  terms  of  subjunctive  
conditionals  rather  than  impressions,  but  loosening  the  hold  of  “necessitated  by”  is  a  signature  
device  of  compatibilism,  a  move  not  unique  to  Hume.    Here’s  Kai  Nielsen,  for  example:      
Legal  laws  prescribe  a  certain  course  of  action.  …  But  laws  of  nature  …  do  
not  constrain  you;  rather  they  are  statements  of  regularities,  of  de  facto  
invariable  sequences  that  are  part  of  the  world.    In  talking  of  such  natural  
laws  we  often  bring  in  an  uncritical  use  of  “force,”  as  if  the  earth  were  
being  pushed  and  pulled  around  by  the  sun.    …  Without  the  
anthropomorphic  embellishment,  it  becomes  evident  that  a  determinist  
commits  himself,  when  he  asserts  that  A  causes  B,  to  the  view  that  
whenever  an  event  or  act  of  type  A  occurs,  an  event  of  type  B  will  occur.    
The  part  about  compulsion  or  constraint  is  metaphorical.”vii    
  
Incompatibilists,  by  contrast,  are  apt  to  presume  that  causal  relations  have  genuinely  modal  
traction,  and  thus  that  a  nomologically  deterministic  environment  would  indeed  be  one  
characterized  by  constraint  (though  there  are  certainly  compatibilists,  too,  who  set  themselves  a  
higher  bar  than  Nielsen  in  this  regard).    Against  the  backdrop  of  this  interface  between  the  
metaphysics  of  causation  and  debates  over  agency,  the  first  question  that  I  want  to  pose  is  this:  
what  happens  to  the  determinism  side  of  the  free  will  problematic  if  one  adopts  a  dispositional  
realist  ontology?    I  shall  suggest  that  it  gives  way  to  what  I’ll  call  a  non-­‐‑deterministic  
framework,  one  that  preserves  elements  of  determinism  and  indeterminism  alike.    Again,  this  is  
what  is  meant  by  “sublate.”    The  point  here  is  that  it  is  not  just  the  entire  problematic  that  is  
sublated,  but  also  the  deterministic  “side”  or  component  of  it  on  its  own.    But  let  me  proceed  by  
first  considering  the  relationship  between  a  belief  in  powers  and  standard  versions  of  
determinism  and  indeterminism.                              
   Stephen  Mumford  and  Rani  Lill  Anjum  have  argued  that  dispositional  realists  can  be  
determinists  because  causation  need  not  be  “the  vehicle  by  which  determinism  does  its  
business.”viii    In  their  view:    
[t]he  core  idea  in  determinism  is  fixity  of  the  future  by  the  past.  …  One  
‘causally  neutral’  statement  of  determinism  would  be  that  the  total  state  
of  the  world  phi  sub  1  at  time  t  sub  1  dictates  that  only  one  state  phi  sub  2  is  
possible  at  t  sub  2  …  we  might  also  say  that  if  two  deterministic  worlds  
coincide  in  their  histories  until  time  t,  then  they  will  coincide  in  their  
histories  after  t.    The  past  can  thus  necessitate,  fix,  limit,  dictate,  or  make  
the  future  without  a  commitment  to  causal  necessitarianism.  …  Such  
descriptions  of  determinism  capture  its  basic  commitment  far  better  than  
causal  determinism,  and  do  so  without  any  mention  of  causation.”ix  
  
This  I  think  is  not  a  persuasive  tack.    Even  if  we  were  to  assume  only  an  ostensibly  non-­‐‑causal  
version  of  determinism  of  the  kind  they  recommend,  we  would  still  want  to  know  what  it  is  
that  accounts  for  the  fact  of  there  being  a  deterministic  relationship  between  time  t  and  time  t+n.    
The  only  response  that  would  by-­‐‑pass  the  phenomenon  of  causation  would  be  a  claim  to  the  
effect  that  all  times  are  co-­‐‑present,  and  that  what  determinism  describes  is  simply  the  fixed  
character  of  the  total  situation.    And  if  we  do  respond  in  this  way,  then  the  original  formulation  
of  determinism  in  terms  of  temporal  succession  begins  to  make  less  sense.    Instead  of  a  
definition  of  determinism,  we  wind  up  with  a  curious,  non-­‐‑standard  iteration  of  eternalism.x    As  
it  happens,  this  is  the  view  that  Roy  Bhaskar  referred  to  as  “actualism,”  which  he  took  to  be  the  
implicit  ontology  of  a  Hume-­‐‑styled  empiricism.xi    It  is  not  that  one  couldn’t  endorse  such  a  
view.    It’s  just  that  it  is  hard  to  see  how  it  would  combine  with  an  anti-­‐‑necessitarian  powers  
ontology,  an  ontology  in  which  some  elements  of  what  occurs  or  does  not  occur  might  be  fixed  
by  kind,  but  in  which  no  token  process  of  change  can  be  guaranteed  to  occur  naturally.            
   Mumford  and  Anjum  argue  as  they  do  because  they  want  to  be  able  to  defend  
determinism,  if  need  be,  whilst  also  defending  the  claim  that  causes  do  not  necessitate  their  
effects.    It  is  also  worth  noting  that  their  argument  against  necessitation  does  not  hinge  upon  the  
nature  of  powers,  in  particular,  as  entities  that  imply  a  distinction  between  potential  and  actual.    
Rather,  the  claim  is  simply  that  it  is  impossible  to  do  away  with  antidotes  and  interferers.    I  
don’t  think  that  re-­‐‑defining  determinism  a-­‐‑causally  is  plausible.    But  there  is  at  least  one  
element  of  the  standard  deterministic  picture  that  a  commitment  to  dispositional  realism  does  
not  compel  one  either  to  endorse  or  reject,  namely,  the  non-­‐‑probabilistic  law-­‐‑statements  that  
figure  in  our  best  natural  scientific  theories.    (One  may  or  may  not  believe  in  the  further  
existence  of  laws  themselves,  in  addition  to  according  a  role  to  law-­‐‑statements.)    From  a  
dispositional  realist  perspective,  true-­‐‑law  statements  will  be  thought  to  be  true  in  virtue  of  
powers  of  a  certain  type.    (Laws  themselves,  if  one  believes  in  them,  will  be  grounded  in  those  
same  powers.)    “Grounded  in  powers”  is  a  broad  concept,  and  dispositional  realists  spell  it  out  
in  different  ways.xii    But  whatever  the  details,  the  powers-­‐‑based  determinist  (I’ll  use  the  term  “p-­‐‑
determinist,”  as  a  reminder  that  the  determinism  in  question  is  not  the  determinism  of  
nomological  necessitation)  –  the  p-­‐‑determinist  will  think  that  the  powers  of  things  are  such  that  
there  are  processes  that  can  be  described  in  terms  of  non-­‐‑probabilistic  lawful  relations  between  
causal  relata.    (And  if  she  believes  in  the  existence  of  laws  themselves,  and  not  just  in  the  
epistemic  value  of  law-­‐‑statements,  she  will  be  likely  to  conceptualize  laws  as  the  relations  or  
processes  that  are  either  manifestations  of  powers  or  sustained  by  the  manifestations  of  
powers.)    She  may  stipulate,  as  Roy  Bhaskar  did,  that  such  processes  do  not  occur  naturally,  
that  they  must  be  artificially  produced  in  the  context  of  the  closed  system  of  an  experiment.    She  
may  even  add  that  an  artificially  closed  system  is  not  guaranteed  to  remain  closed,  and  that  
insofar  as  the  lawfulness  exhibited  therein  is  subject  to  interference,  it  is  not  really  lawful.    The  
point,  however,  is  that  she  will  be  able  to  give  a  powers-­‐‑based  account  of  the  element  of  
standard  determinism  that  is  non-­‐‑probabilistic  law  talk  –  even  if  she  herself  rejects  such  talk  
altogether.                  
   Similarly,  for  a  dispositional  realist  who  defends  indeterminism,  p-­‐‑indeterminacy  will  be  
thought  to  be  a  function  of  the  natures  of  the  powers  of  things.    One  might  argue  –  as  has  E.  J.  
Lowe,  for  example  –  that  the  human  will  is  a  power  whereby  agents  spontaneously  initiate  
change.xiii    The  existence  of  such  a  power  or  cluster  of  powers,  a  p-­‐‑indeterminist  could  say,  
disrupts  an  otherwise  p-­‐‑deterministic  order,  i.e.,  one  consisting  only  of  the  type  of  power  that  
underwrites  deterministic  law-­‐‑statements.    And  if  one  were  precluded  from  appealing  to  the  
mental  powers  of  agents  by  an  independent  commitment  to  a  reductive  physicalism,  or  if  one  
thought  that  such  an  appeal  somehow  begged  the  question,  one  could  point  instead  to  the  
spontaneously  expressed  powers  of  physical  entities  such  as  electrons  –  as  numerous  powers  
theorists  have  also  done,  for  other  reasons,  including  Lowe.    It  might  be  tempting  to  think  that  
dispositional  realism  actually  entails  a  belief  in  free  will.    But  a  powers  theorist  who  was  a  hard  
p-­‐‑determinist  would  simply  deny  outright  the  existence  of  spontaneously  expressed  powers,  
including  any  thought  to  be  had  by  human  agents.    Moreover,  even  if  she  were  a  p-­‐‑
indeterminist,  allowing  for  the  spontaneous  powers  of  electrons,  a  powers  theorist  who  was  a  
reductive  physicalist  would  think  (a)  that  it  is  bodies,  not  agents,  that  are  the  bearers  of  
whatever  powers  exist;  and  (b)  that  the  powers  borne  by  bodies  are  physical  properties,  not  
emergent  mental  properties.    Indeed,  for  this  reason  it  is  not  clear  that  a  powers  version  of  
reductive  physicalism,  even  an  indeterministic  one,  may  be  combined  with  a  belief  in  the  
existence  of  distinctive  power(s)  borne  by  agents,  the  reality  of  which  a  compatibilist  who  was  a  
dispositional  realist  would  have  to  affirm.    I  will  return  to  this  point  in  section  two.              
   But  while  a  powers-­‐‑based  metaphysics  may  be  shown  to  be  consistent  with  aspects  of  
determinism  and  indeterminism  alike,  the  conclusion  of  that  very  analysis  is  that  what  
dispositional  realism  lends  itself  to  most  naturally  is  a  non-­‐‑determinist  sublation  of  the  terms.    I  
have  suggested  above  that  the  powers  of  some  kinds  of  things  may  give  rise  to  regular  
conjunctions  of  event.xiv    Such  powers  sustain  deterministic  laws.    Other  kinds  of  powers,  borne  
by  other  kinds  of  causal  bearers,  do  not.    Their  expression,  by  contrast,  is  only  ever  probabilistic  
–  or,  in  the  case  of  intentional  acts,  one  might  want  to  say,  not  lawfully  ordered  at  all.    On  this  
way  of  thinking,  deterministic  processes,  probabilistic  processes  and  free  acts  are  all  made  true  
by  the  same  underlying  reality,  namely  one  containing  powerful  particulars  of  different  kinds,  
having  qualitatively  different  kinds  of  causal  powers.    For  the  purposes  of  my  own  argument,  
the  initial  point  is  this:    in  allowing  for  such  an  account,  dispositional  realism  provides  what  can  
be  thought  of  as  a  dialectical  resolution  to  the  opposition  between  determinism  and  
indeterminism.    The  position  is  non-­‐‑deterministic,  but  it  includes  a  “regional”  determinism  (i.e.,  
it  includes  the  type  of  power  that  underwrites  the  partial  truth  of  determinism  as  a  global  claim,  
that  partial  truth  being  the  fact  that  there  seems  to  be  a  role  for  non-­‐‑probabilistic  law-­‐‑statements  
to  play  in  our  best  theories  of  what  the  world  is  like).    At  the  same  time,  the  position  allows  its  
proponents  to  presume  that  all  events  are  caused,  and  caused  in  the  same  sense  (i.e.,  by  the  
exercise  of  powers),  regardless  of  whether  the  process  in  question  conforms  to  deterministic  
laws,  to  probabilistic  laws,  or  to  no  laws.      
   In  a  moment  I  shall  turn  to  the  free  will  side  of  the  problematic,  but  it  should  be  
immediately  apparent  that  a  powers-­‐‑based  metaphysics  will  do  more  than  alter  the  structure  of  
the  determinism  side  of  the  construct.    If  nothing  else,  we  can  see  that  agency,  from  a  
dispositional  realist  perspective,  will  no  longer  have  to  be  reconciled  with  either  (a)  standard  
nomological  determinism;  or  (b)  gaps  in,  or  the  suspension  of,  causation.    Rather,  the  
dispositional  realist  is  left  only  with  the  unexceptional  fact  that  human  beings  are  neither  
omnipotent  nor  the  only  causal  bearers  on  the  scene.    Our  doings  as  agents  occur  in  a  field  of  
powers  exercised  by  other  powerful  particulars,  ranging  from  electrons  to  bacteria  to  the  
international  banking  system.    Some  things  have  powers  that  can  thwart  our  own,  others  do  
not.    Some  –  sugar,  water,  proteins,  wood  or  stone,  the  sun  –  have  powers  that  we  need  in  order  
to  survive.    To  the  extent  that  the  problem  at  the  heart  of  the  Humean-­‐‑inflected  free  will  debate  
is  how  to  combine  agency  with  causation,  the  dispositional  realist  response  is  that  agency  is  the  
name  for  the  expression  of  a  distinctive  kind  of  causal  power,  one  had  by  sentient  substances.    
There  is  nothing  surprising  about  the  fact,  if  it  is  one,  that  there  are  qualitatively  different  kinds  
of  powers,  or  that  some  are  more  complicated  or  remarkable  or  important  to  us  than  others.    I  
have  elsewhere  called  the  stance  that  I  am  describing  (when  it  is  combined  with  a  view  of  
individuals  as  emergent,  non-­‐‑dualistic  entities)  “Aristotelian  compatibilism,”  a  label  meant  to  
capture  the  idea  that  agency  is  indeed  compatible  with  causation.xv    But  it  could  equally  well  be  
described  as  a  re-­‐‑conceptualized  agent-­‐‑causal  libertarianism,  one  that  requires  neither  a  notion  
of  a-­‐‑causal  agency  nor  the  invocation  of  a  special,  ad  hoc  kind  of  causality.    Whichever  name  one  
prefers,  however,  what  matters  is  that  dispositional  realism  is  a  view  from  the  perspective  of  
which  it  is  possible  to  (a)  make  sense  of  each  of  the  conceptual  locations  within  the  space  of  the  
standard  problematic;  whilst  (b)  recognizing  them  to  be  partial  and/or  misconceived.      Let  
emphasize  yet  again,  however,  that  the  claim  is  not  that  the  traditional  problematic  has  been  
solved  according  to  its  own  rules;  I  do  not  wish  to  be  misunderstood  on  this  point.  
   We  can  also  see  already  that  a  powers-­‐‑based  perspective  will  undo  any  putative  
contradiction  between  agency  and  the  deliverances  of  science,  i.e.,  between  a  scientific  
understanding  of  ourselves  and  our  pre-­‐‑scientific,  “manifest”  self-­‐‑image,  as  Willfred  Sellars  put  
it.    Here  the  apparent  conflict  derives  from  the  belief  that  causation  amounts  to  the  rule  of  law  
(or  to  the  fact  of  order),  and  that  therefore  the  aim  of  science  is  to  identify  laws  (or  de  facto  
regularities).    Call  this  a  nomological  conception  of  science.    If  one  subscribes  to  such  a  view,  
then  any  account  of  agency  according  to  which  agents  (rather  than  laws)  are  the  determining  
source  of  their  own  actions  will  appear  to  fun  afoul  of  the  norms  of  scientific  explanation.    For  it  
would  seem,  from  such  a  perspective,  that  proponents  of  an  agent-­‐‑centered  account  are  
prepared  to  invoke  the  a-­‐‑causal  workings  of  some  occult-­‐‑like  process  in  order  to  preserve  our  
favored  identity  as  self-­‐‑legislating.    This  line  of  thinking  gives  an  epistemic  face  to  the  
metaphysical  problem  of  uncaused  free  acts:    free  acts  are  not  just  random;  they  are  in  principle  
scientifically  inexplicable.    Libertarians,  it  follows,  insofar  as  they  celebrate  the  existence  of  such  
phenomena,  are  patently  anti-­‐‑scientific.    The  dispositional  realist  will  reject  the  nomological  
account  of  the  aim  of  science  outright.    Insofar  as  it  is  the  powers  of  things  that  ground  law-­‐‑
statements  (and  laws,  if  laws  exist),  she  will  say,  it  is  the  discovery  of  powers  that  is  the  
fundamental  aim  of  scientific  inquiry.    Dispositional  realist  philosophers  of  natural  science  tend  
to  argue  that  such  an  account  is  descriptively  superior  to  nomological  alternatives.    Nancy  
Cartwright  and  Brian  Ellis,  for  example,  have  long  advanced  such  a  view.    In  the  social  sciences,  
where  the  practical  commitment  to  Humean  regularity  theory  is  perhaps  stronger  than  in  the  
natural  sciences,  the  dispositional  realist’s  meta-­‐‑claim  may  be  a  normative  one,  to  the  effect  that  
the  paucity  of  social  science  may  be  explained  by  its  practitioners’  efforts  to  isolate  constant  
conjunctions  rather  than  to  identify  causal  powers.xvi    In  any  case,  the  point  is  that  the  
dispositional  realist  will  not  recognize  Sellars’  science/agency  dichotomy.    Agency  is  a  species  of  
causal  power,  she  will  say,  science  the  study  of  such  powers  generally.  
  
(ii)  Powers  and  Free  Will    
   Let  me  turn  now  to  the  free  will  side  of  the  problematic.    The  discussion  of  free  will  in  
analytic  philosophy  has  come  to  involve,  at  a  minimum,  the  following  themes  or  terms:  (1)  
being  the  cause  of;  (2)  intelligibility,  control  or  luck;    (3)  moral  responsibility;  (4)  the  possibility  
of  having  done  otherwise;  (5)  acting  for  a  reason;  (6)  psychic  harmony,  unity  and/or  
authenticity;  (7)  being  “fully”  or  “genuinely”  free.    There  is  extensive  debate  surrounding  each  
of  these  points.    My  contention  is  that  the  adoption  of  a  powers-­‐‑based  ontology  has  implications  
for  how  all  of  these  issues  are  understood,  as  well  as  for  how  some  inter-­‐‑relate.    Support  for  this  
claim  is  to  be  found  at  the  level  of  the  big  picture  (or  at  least  the  medium  picture),  rather  than  at  
the  level  of  fine  detail.    I  shall  proceed,  therefore,  by  outlining,  at  a  degree  of  resolution  
designed  to  cut  the  issues  mostly  cleanly  at  their  philosophical  joints,  what  the  dispositional  
realist  will  most  naturally  say  in  relation  to  each  of  the  variables  above.                                            
(1)  Being  the  cause  of    
   Several  powers-­‐‑based  theories  of  causation  have  been  developed  by  contemporary  
philosophers,  and  there  are  appreciable  differences  between  them.    But  as  I’ve  said,  it’s  the  
broader  contours  that  matter  for  present  purposes.    From  a  dispositional  realist  perspective,  
causal  processes  involve  the  display  of  a  power  or  powers.    To  be  the  cause  of  an  outcome  is  to  
be  either  the  power(s)  or  the  bearer  of  the  power(s)  expressed  in  any  given  causal  process  or  
kind  of  causal  process.    While  a  dispositional  realist  might  hold  that  events,  and  not  just  
substances,  are  bearers  of  causal  powers,  the  model  can  be  said  to  be  substance-­‐‑causal  rather  
than  event-­‐‑causal  in  the  sense  that  a  causation,  from  this  perspective,  is  a  matter  of  a  “thing”  of  
an  allowable  type  (potentially  including  events)  having  actively  produced  (or  co-­‐‑produced)  a  
change  of  some  kind  (or  its  powers  having  done  so).    The  non-­‐‑powers  theorist  does  not  
conceptualize  causation  in  generative  terms  at  all.    It  is  important  to  be  very  clear  about  this  
contrast.    In  “Compatibilism  Without  Frankfurt:  Dispositional  Analyses  of  Free  Will,”  for  
example,  Bernard  Berofsky  ostensibly  considers  the  possibility  that  realism  about  causal  powers  
could  bolster  what  he  calls  “conditionalist  compatibilism.”xvii    In  so  doing  he  explicitly  
references  Stephen  Mumford  and  Brian  Ellis.    Berofsky’s  conclusion  is  that  it  cannot.    What  is  
pertinent,  however,  is  not  the  conclusion  –  nor  Berofsky’s  offhand  assertion  that  “if  free  will  is  a  
disposition,  it  is  evidently  not  basic  and  would,  therefore,  more  plausibly  rest  on  some  sort  of  
causal  basis”xviii  –  but  rather  the  fact  that,  having  contrasted  realism  about  causal  powers  with  
conditional  analyses,  he  then  blithely  glosses  over  the  fundamental  difference  between  them  as  
accounts  of  causation.    Indeed,  the  very  notion  of  “some  sort  of  causal  basis”  that  he  takes  
Mumford  and  Ellis-­‐‑style  agential  powers  to  require,  he  presumes  the  dispositional  realist  may  
simply  lift  from  Lewis.xix    
   The  conceptual  effects  of  adopting  a  genuinely  powers-­‐‑based  approach  include  the  
following.    First,  a  powers-­‐‑based  account  of  causation  allows  efficacy  to  attach  directly  to  the  
causal  bearer,  in  this  case  (presumptively)  an  agent.    The  agent  really  is  “the  cause  of.”    She  is  
the  cause  not  in  virtue  of  somehow  being  the  antecedent  condition,  but  in  virtue  of  being  the  
bearer  of  the  causal  powers  implicated  in  the  production  of  the  outcome.    Thus  causation  and  
agential  control  do  not  come  apart,  for  the  dispositional  realist,  as  they  do  for  the  standard  
event-­‐‑causal  libertarian  or  compatibilist.    The  agent  is  not  a  link  in  a  chain  of  events  that  is  itself  
the  site  of  causation.    Nor  is  she  connected  in  some  to-­‐‑be-­‐‑specified  way  to  phenomena  that  are  
either  uncaused  or  only  probabilistically  caused.    Rather,  she  just  is  the  cause,  in  virtue  of  
bearing  the  essential  (and  inessential)  dispositional  properties  that  she  does.    This  much,  of  
course,  the  dispositional  realist  shares  with  the  agent-­‐‑causalist  who  otherwise  endorses  non-­‐‑
productive  event-­‐‑causation.    But  –  and  this  is  a  second  point  –  the  difference  between  them  is  
that  all  causes  are  causes  in  the  same  sense,  for  the  dispositional  realist.    In  all  cases,  to  be  the  
cause  of  x  is  to  be  the  powerful  particular  that  brought  x  about,  or  that  did  so  in  concert  with  
other  causes.xx    The  fact  that  agents  may  be  said  to  be  causes  follows  straight-­‐‑forwardly  from  the  
metaphysics  of  causation,  for  the  dispositional  realist;  it  is  not  a  further  thesis  to  be  established.    
Notice  that  these  two  points  together  yield  a  response  to  one  type  of  objection  to  agent-­‐‑
causation,  voiced  here  by  Laura  Ekstrom,  viz.,  that  even  if  we  grant  that  an  agent  is  the  cause  of  
x,  the  agent-­‐‑causalist  can’t  say  what  caused  the  agent  to  cause  x  (let  alone  to  cause  it  when  she  
did).xxi    Here’s  Ekstrom:    “But  how  can  I,  as  a  persisting  entity,  make  something  happen  (or  come  
to  exist)?    Normally,  when  something  happens,  something  else  happened  previous  to  it  to  cause  
it  to  occur.  …  But  I  do  not  happen;  I  simply  exist.”xxii    The  dispositional  realist  will  respond  that  
the  incredulity  is  unwarranted.    It  is,  indeed,  nothing  other  than  persisting  powerful  particulars  
that  make  things  happen  (and  perhaps  also  non-­‐‑persisting  ones).    Not  just  in  the  case  of  agents,  
but  generally.    Agents  have  powers  of  consciousness,  such  that  we  are  capable  of  making  things  
happen  in  quite  a  sophisticated  manner,  but  neither  intentionality  nor  spontaneity  are  unique  to  
us.    Finally,  the  dispositional  realist  will  not  conflate  the  idea  of  “being  the  cause  of”  with  that  of  
moral  culpability.    Berofsky,  who  distinguishes  the  question  of  free  will  from  that  of  moral  
responsibility  independently  of  any  commitment  to  dispositional  realism,  puts  this  point  nicely.    
He  writes,  “I  believe  that  the  free  will  problem  as  a  problem  generated  by  the  prospect  of  
determinism  is  a  metaphysical  problem.    It  cannot,  therefore,  be  solved  just  by  examining  the  
concept  of  responsibility  and  the  varied  social  and  moral  dimensions  of  agential  evaluation.”xxiii    
As  I  hope  to  show,  many  if  not  all  of  the  considerations  that,  for  the  event-­‐‑causalist  
(compatibilist  and  incompatibilist  alike),  end  up  doing  the  work  that  would  otherwise  be  done  
by  the  account  of  causation  will  be  seen,  from  a  powers  perspective,  to  have  no  bearing  upon  
the  core  metaphysical  question,  which  is  whether  or  not  a  certain  kind  of  causal  power  exists,  
arguably  as  an  essential  property  of  human  beings.  
(2)  Intelligibility,  Control  or  Luck      
   The  dispositional  realist  does  not  face  the  so-­‐‑called  intelligibility  problem,  viz.,  the  
difficulty  of  showing  how  it  can  be  that  agents  are  able  to  influence  or  direct  the  causal  
processes  in  which  they  figure.    I’ve  elsewhere  referred  to  this  as  the  traction  problem,xxiv  and  it  
also  often  comes  under  the  headings  of  “luck”  or  “control.”    For  obvious  reasons,  the  problem  is  
one  that  is  faced  by  libertarians  who  hold  that  a  free  act  has  no  cause  at  all.    But  it  is  also  faced  
by  compatibilists,  and  by  those  libertarians  who  hold  that  free  acts  are  caused  but  only  caused  
probabilistically.    The  compatibilist  has  to  show  that  agents  somehow  have  causal  control  over  
their  acts  even  though  their  acts  are  deterministically  caused  by  antecedent  conditions  plus  the  
laws  of  nature.    The  libertarian  who  believes  that  free  acts  are  probabilistically  caused,  
meanwhile,  faces  challenges  on  both  sides:  on  the  one  hand,  she  has  to  show  that  agents  have  
control  even  in  those  cases  in  which  the  probabilistic  regularity  does  not  occur  (i.e.,  during  the  
exact  gap  in  causation  that  presumably  allows  for  free  will);  on  the  other  hand,  she  too,  like  the  
compatibilist,  has  to  show  that  the  agent  has  causal  control  even  though  the  agent  is  not  herself  
the  cause.    By  contrast,  the  problem  doesn’t  get  started  for  the  powers  theorist.    From  a  powers  
perspective,  causation  is  not  something  that  exists  or  occurs  independently  of  the  powerful  
particulars  that  bear  the  properties  displayed  in  any  given  causal  process.    And  lest  one  worry  
that  this  just  pushes  the  problem  back  a  frame  (by  introducing  a  causal  relationship  between  the  
entity  and  its  powers),  the  response  to  the  concern  is  that  the  relationship  between  a  powerful  
particular  and  its  own  essential  dispositional  properties  not  itself  causal:  it’s  constitutive  (or  
categorical,  as  Mumford  and  Anjum  put  it,  citing  Kant).xxv    Salt  does  not  stand  in  a  relationship  
of  causal  control  over  its  power  to  melt  ice.    Rather,  it  just  has  the  power,  as  part  and  parcel  of  
its  being  salt.    Human  agents,  unlike  salt,  have  second-­‐‑order  powers,  as  a  function  of  our  first-­‐‑
order  power  of  consciousness.xxvi    And  both  our  first  and  second-­‐‑order  powers  afford  us  a  type  
of  control  over  what  we  do  that  salt  does  not  enjoy.    But,  as  with  salt  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  the  powers  borne  
by  members  of  its  kind,  members  of  our  kind  just  have  the  power,  if  we  do,  to  intentionally  
exercise  or  refrain  from  exercising  our  first-­‐‑order  powers.    This  said,  the  fact  that  control  comes  
for  free,  as  it  were,  entails  neither  that  an  agent  will  be  able,  in  any  given  case,  to  exercise  the  
powers  that  she  chooses  to  exercise,  nor,  if  she  is  so  able,  that  she  will  succeed  in  bringing  about  
any  given  outcome.      But  “control  over”  is  not  a  problem  about  necessitation.    Rather,  it  is  a  
problem  –  one  not  had  by  the  powers  theorist  -­‐‑  concerning  either  (a)  (for  indeterminist  
libertarians  and  for  compatibilists)  how  to  attach  causation  itself  to  agents;  or,  (b)  (for  the  non-­‐‑
causal  libertarian)  how  to  connect  agents  to  their  uncaused  acts.    Note  that  the  dispositional  
realist  will  be  at  a  similar  advantage  in  defending  any  position  that  trades  upon  the  notion  of  
source-­‐‑hood  (e.g.,  source  incompatibilism).xxvii     
(3)  Moral  responsibility  
   There  is  prima  facie  plausibility  to  the  idea  that  being  metaphysically  free  is  a  necessary  
condition  for  being  blame-­‐‑  or  credit-­‐‑worthy.    In  discussions  of  this  point,  the  focal  question  has  
become:  “Is  someone  who  could  not  have  done  otherwise  morally  responsible  for  her  acts?”xxviii     
I  address  the  issue  of  alternative  possibilities  in  the  next  section.    Here  I  want  to  look  at  what  the  
dispositional  realist  will  say  about  moral  responsibility  and  free  will,  but  I  want  to  bracket  the  
notion  of  having  been  able  to  do  otherwise.    Let  me  also  distinguish  between  the  task  at  hand  
and  the  far  more  comprehensive  and  substantive  matter  of  considering  what  implications  a  
powers  ontology  might  have,  if  any,  for  the  shape  of  moral  philosophy  more  generally  –  and/or  
what  a  positive  powers-­‐‑based  moral  theory  might  look  like.xxix    I’m  interested  only  in  the  
narrow  question  of  how  the  specific  variables  that  I’ve  identified  will  or  should  be  parsed  by  the  
powers  theorist.  
   There  are  three  possible  scenarios  in  relation  to  which,  from  a  dispositional  realist  
perspective,  we  may  ask  about  the  attribution  of  blame  or  credit,  relative  to  specifically  
metaphysical  concerns:  first,  one  in  which  we  assume  that  the  agent,  in  virtue  of  her  agential  
powers,  has  either  caused  or  undertaken  to  cause  a  given  outcome  x;  second,  one  in  which  we  
assume  that  the  agent  did  not  cause  x  (and  didn’t  undertake  to  do  so);  third,  one  in  which  we  
assume  a  powers-­‐‑based  version  of  determinism.    In  the  case  of  scenario  (1),  the  powers  theorist  
–  as  we’ve  seen  –  will  separate  the  question  “Which  powers  were  involved  in  the  causal  display  
that  brought  about  x?”  from  the  question  “Who  or  what  is  morally  responsible  for  x?”    Unlike  
the  Kantian,  for  instance,  who  will  say  that  free  will  just  is  the  capacity  for  ethical  action,  the  
dispositional  realist  will  not  conflate  the  phenomenon  of  causation  with  that  of  morality.      
However,  if  a  powers  theorist  did  want  to  say  that  causing  x  renders  an  agent  morally  
responsible  for  x,  either  as  a  rule  or  in  a  given  case,  the  dissolution  of  the  luck  or  traction  
problem  would  facilitate  the  ascription  of  credit  or  blame  (inasmuch  as  it  does  away  with  the  
need  to  “attach”  the  act  to  the  agent  at  the  level  of  metaphysics).    The  nomological  theorist,  by  
contrast,  may  find  herself  in  the  position  of  saying  that  moral  responsibility  comes  along  with  
“being  the  cause  of,”  whilst  having  residual  difficulty  fusing  causation  itself  to  agents.    The  
issue  that  potentially  emerges  with  respect  to  scenario  (2),  meanwhile,  is  transitivity.    The  
dispositional  realist  will  not  be  able  to  invoke  the  notion  of  an  unbroken  causal  chain  in  order  to  
establish  that  Agent  A  is  an  indirect  cause  of  x.    Instead,  she  will  have  to  say  that  A’s  own  
powers  played  a  role  in  producing  x.    I  do  not  want  to  comment  on  whether  or  not  a  powers-­‐‑
based  ontology  therefore  precludes  a  commitment  to  causal  transitivity.    At  a  minimum,  it  
seems  as  though  a  powers-­‐‑based  transitivity  would  be  punctuated  –  stopping  and  then  starting  
afresh  with  each  qualitatively  different  power,  borne  by  each  causally  implicated  powerful  
particular.xxx    The  need  to  re-­‐‑conceive  or  even  reject  transitivity  may  set  the  bar  higher  for  
establishing  instances  of  indirect  causation,  but  it  shouldn’t  prevent  the  dispositional  realist  
from  assigning  credit  or  blame  where  either  is  thought  due.         
   Scenario  (3)  is  especially  interesting.    It  will  be  difficult  for  the  powers  theorist  who  is  a  
(powers-­‐‑based)  p-­‐‑determinist  to  ascribe  blame  or  credit  to  agents  because  it  will  be  difficult  for  
her  to  claim  the  existence  of  agents,  as  distinct  from  bodies.    To  defend  determinism  in  a  
powers-­‐‑based  environment,  recall,  is  to  reject  the  existence  of  spontaneous  powers,  be  they  
physical  or  mental.    But  a  putative  “agent”  with  no  spontaneous  powers  would  be  gratuitous,  
ontologically;  the  powerful  particular  in  question  would  have  only  and  precisely  the  kinds  of  
powers  had  by  bodies.    Another  way  to  put  it  would  be  to  say  that  the  powers  theorist  who  is  a  
determinist  will  have  already  answered,  in  the  negative,  the  question  of  whether  or  not  in  
addition  to  physical  entities  that  bear  only  deterministic  powers,  there  also  exist  powerful  
particulars  who  are  agents,  bearing  non-­‐‑deterministic  powers.    The  same  will  hold  at  the  level  
of  properties.    Non-­‐‑emergent  mental  properties  –  i.e.,  mental  powers  that  are,  in  the  end,  
physical  powers  (be  this  via  reduction,  supervenience  or  function)  –  will  show  up  as  redundant  
on  a  dispositional  realist  ontological  inventory,  an  implausible  attempt  to  avoid  bearing  the  cost  
of  the  ontological  equation.    The  notion  of  a  non-­‐‑reductive  but  nonetheless  deterministic  mental  
property,  meanwhile,  will  be  hard  to  make  sense  of,  from  this  perspective.    What  would  such  a  
power  be  a  power  to  do?    As  I  noted  earlier,  it  is  simply  not  at  all  clear  that  the  dispositional  
realist  can  combine  a  belief  in  powerful  particulars  bearing  distinctively  agential  powers  with  a  
belief  in  a  powers-­‐‑based  causal  determinism.    
(4)  The  possibility  of  having  done  otherwise  
   If  standard,  nomological  determinism  is  true,  and  at  all  times  t  there  is  only  one  possible  
future,  then  it  looks  as  though,  for  reasons  unrelated  to  her,  an  actor  will  never  have  been  able  
to  have  done  otherwise  than  as  she  did.    And  it  seems  plausible,  as  I’ve  said,  to  think  that  
someone  who  could  not  possibly  have  done  otherwise  is  not  morally  responsible  for  her  
behavior.    Harry  Frankfurt’s  now-­‐‑classic  case  of  Jones  #4,  the  hapless  fellow  who  could  not  have  
done  otherwise  and  yet  appears  to  be  morally  responsible,  was  designed  to  avert  such  a  
conclusion  by  showing  that  moral  responsibility  does  not,  in  fact,  require  alternative  
possibilities.    There  is  an  extensive,  highly  specialized  literature  on  Frankfurt  cases,  but  I  want  
to  stay  focused  on  the  big  picture.    The  question  that  I  want  to  pose  is  this:  “What,  if  anything,  
changes  about  Frankfurt  cases,  if  we  transpose  them  into  a  dispositional  realist  metaphysical  
register?”    For  simplicity’s  sake  I  will  take  Frankfurt’s  original  version  of  the  story  as  the  basis  
for  reflection.    In  Frankfurt’s  version,  someone  named  Black  wants  someone  named  Jones  to  do  
x.    But  to  quote  Frankfurt,  “he  prefers  to  avoid  showing  his  hand  unnecessarily.”xxxi    Thus,  so  
long  as  Jones  is  on  course  to  choose  to  do  x  on  his  own,  Black  will  not  get  involved.    But  if  Jones  
(the  fourth  version  of  Jones  in  the  account)  should  decide  against  doing  x,  Black  is  prepared  to  
go  to  whatever  lengths  necessary  in  order  to  ensure  that  he,  Jones,  ends  up  doing  x  after  all.    We  
can  fill  in  the  blank  as  to  how  Black  will  pull  this  off,  says  Frankfurt.    “Anyone  with  a  theory  
concerning  what  ‘could  have  done  otherwise’  means  may  answer  this  question  for  himself  by  
describing  whatever  measures  he  would  regard  as  sufficient  to  guarantee  that,  in  the  relevant  
sense,  Jones4  cannot  do  otherwise.”xxxii    The  only  thing  that  matters  is  that  Jones  will,  if  it  comes  
to  it,  be  unable  but  to  do  x.    As  it  happens,  there  is  no  need  for  Black  to  intervene.    Jones  does  x  
all  on  his  own.    Therefore,  says  Frankfurt,  Jones  is  morally  responsible  for  having  done  x,  even  
though  in  point  of  fact  he  could  not  have  done  otherwise.  
   A  dispositional  realist  account  of  Jones’  behavior  is  not  hard  to  make  out.    Jones  has,  of  
his  own  accord,  exercised  his  agential  powers.    If  one  thinks  that  agents  are  morally  responsible  
for  un-­‐‑coerced  displays  of  their  causal  powers,  then  there  is  no  question  but  that  Jones  is  
responsible  for  his  having  done  x.    But  what’s  going  on  in  the  counterfactual  scenario?    It  cannot  
be  the  same  powers  of  the  same  entity  that  are  being  expressed,  because  the  role  of  the  events  
depicted  in  the  counterfactual  scenario  is  to  provide  a  fail-­‐‑safe,  relative  to  the  properly  agential  
powers  of  the  actual  Jones.    Who,  then  –  or  what  –  bears  the  fail-­‐‑safe  powers  that,  if  needed,  will  
be  exercised  in  the  counterfactual  context?    Black  does.    Black  is  determined  to  bring  about  
Jones’  doing  of  x.    To  be  sure,  counterfactual-­‐‑Jones  is  also  involved.    But  how?    For  the  
dispositional  realist,  the  fact  that  counterfactual-­‐‑Jones  is  not  the  author  of  the  actions  that  are  
ostensibly  his  –  else  there’d  be  no  fail-­‐‑safe,  relative  to  actual  Jones  –  means  that  he  lacks  an  
essential  power  in  virtue  of  which  entities  count  as  being  agents,  rather  than  as  being  some  
other  kind  of  powerful  particular.xxxiii    Counterfactual-­‐‑Jones  isn’t  a  non-­‐‑conscious  body,  though.    
He  lacks  the  defining  powers  of  an  agent,  but  he  has  powers  that  mere  bodies  (if  there  were  
such  things)  would  not  have.    For  one  thing,  he  believes  himself  to  have  genuine  agential  
powers.  And  he  is  an  entity  that  is  capable  of  having  such  a  belief.    Still,  we  know  better.    For  
again,  if  counterfactual-­‐‑Jones  were  really  in  possession  of  agential  powers,  then  actual-­‐‑Black  
would  have  no  back-­‐‑up  plan.    Perhaps  counterfactual-­‐‑Jones  is  best  conceived  as  being  an  
extremely  sophisticated  tool,  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  both  counterfactual-­‐‑Black  and  actual-­‐‑Black  (both  of  
whom,  by  contrast,  bear  unambiguously  agential  powers).    The  important  point,  however,  is  
that  from  a  dispositional  realist  perspective,  the  counterfactual  scenario  is  superfluous.    There  is  
nothing  to  be  learnt  about  Jones’  moral  culpability  in  acting  as  he  does,  and/or  about  his  
metaphysical  standing  as  an  agent,  from  knowing  the  degree  of  Black’s  determination  to  
exercise  his  own  agential  powers  in  order  to  secure  the  end  that  he,  Black,  desires.      
   Admittedly,  the  gist  of  what  I’ve  just  said  has  been  claimed  by  non-­‐‑powers  theorists  too,  
in  the  form  of  arguments  related  to  causal  histories  and  source-­‐‑hood.xxxiv    If  counterfactual-­‐‑Jones  
isn’t  really  Jones,  then  even  for  the  nomological  event-­‐‑causalist,  the  case  isn’t  one  in  which  Jones  
himself  could  not  have  done  otherwise.    What  difference  does  it  make,  then,  to  adopt  a  powers-­‐‑
based  perspective  on  Frankfurt  cases?    One  answer  is  this:  dispositional  realism  addresses  
concerns  about  causal  history,  identification  and  source-­‐‑hood  by  default.    Just  as  the  
dispositional  realist  does  not  have  to  find  a  way  to  attach  causation  to  entities  in  order  to  secure  
causal  control,  she  doesn’t  have  to  perform  an  added  genealogical  operation  in  order  to  
establish  whether  or  not  the  powers  of  a  given  powerful  particular  are  its  own  powers.    Jones’  
powers  qua  agent  are  his  necessarily;  Black’s  are  Black’s.    Given  the  requirements  of  the  
imagined  scenario,  counterfactual-­‐‑Jones  can’t  have  the  distinctive  authorial  powers  of  an  agent,  
though  he  does  have  some  powers.    Also,  once  the  Humean  nomological  theorist  has  sorted  out  
the  causal  histories  so  as  to  establish  that  actual-­‐‑Jones  is  not  counterfactual-­‐‑Jones,  she  will  still  
have  the  attachment  or  control  problem,  and  the  powers  theorist  will  not.                                
  
(5)  Acting  for  a  reason  
   The  concept  of  acting  for  a  reason  enters  the  free  will  debate  first  as  a  response  to  the  
intelligibility  problem.    Carl  Ginet,  for  example,  suggests  that  because  uncaused  acts  are  
explicable  via  reference  to  reasons,  they  are  not  random.xxxv    Others  have  made  similar  
arguments  to  the  effect  that  free,  probabilistically  caused  actions  attach  in  the  right  way  to  
agents  because  such  actions  are  caused  in  whole  or  in  part  by  the  having  of  reasons.xxxvi     Finally,  
Randolph  Clarke  has  suggested  that  even  a  viable  agent-­‐‑causal  theory  would  have  to  be  
augmented  by  an  event-­‐‑causal  account  of  acting  for  reasons.xxxvii     Of  all  of  the  issues  on  the  free  
will  side  of  the  problematic,  this  one  is  perhaps  most  salient  for  the  dispositional  realist.    I  say  
this  because  cognition  is  clearly  a  core  component  of  the  power  to  spontaneously  and  
intentionally  exercise  one’s  other  powers.    The  concept  of  acting  for  a  reason  can  therefore  be  
expected  to  play  an  important  role  in  any  powers-­‐‑based  account  of  free  will.    Certainly  this  is  so  
in  the  two  leading  versions  published  to  date,  those  of  Tim  O’Connor  and  Jonathan  Lowe.    
O’Connor  argues  that  agents  cause  intentions-­‐‑to-­‐‑do-­‐‑x-­‐‑for-­‐‑reason-­‐‑R  (where  reasons  are  defined  
in  internalist  terms).xxxviii     Lowe  has  it  that  agents  cause  x  by  way  of  willing  to  do  so,  in  response  
to  reasons(s)  R  (where  reasons  are  construed  along  externalist  lines).xxxix    Of  course,  in  addition  
to  such  relatively  fine-­‐‑grained  disagreements,  variations  in  underlying  powers-­‐‑based  ontologies  
will  no  doubt  lead  to  broader  variation  in  powers-­‐‑based  approaches  to  agency  as  more  are  
developed.    Ellis,  for  example,  maintains  that  dispositional  properties  are  the  essences  of  what  
he  calls  dynamic  universals,  or  process  kinds.    He  also  holds  that  human  beings  are  the  bearers  
of  second-­‐‑order,  “meta-­‐‑powers.”xl    A  fully  worked-­‐‑out  Ellis-­‐‑style  account  of  agency  might  well  
feature  agency  as  the  process  kind,  the  dispositional  essence  of  which  is  precisely  the  2nd-­‐‑order  
power  that  Ellis  attributes  to  fully  functioning  human  substances.    Similarly,  an  elaborated  
Mumford  and  Anjum-­‐‑style  theory  might  include  the  claim  that  agential  powers,  like  other  
causal  powers,  require  manifestation  partners.    But  all  powers  theorists  will  agree  that  the  
ability  to  reason  is  an  essential  agential  power.    Furthermore,  they  will  also  all  part  company  
with  (a)  event-­‐‑causal  libertarians  who  hold  that  reasons  plus  uncaused  or  only  probabilistically  
caused  events  add  up  to  agency;  and  (b)  event-­‐‑causal  compatibilists  who  hold  that  free  will  can  
be  defined  non-­‐‑causally,  by  reference  to  the  presence  or  absence  of  certain  kinds  of  motivating  
beliefs  and/or  desires  or  patterns  thereof.      
    
(6)  Unity,  hierarchy,  harmony  
   Plato  suggested  that  the  person  who  is  driven  by  appetites  for  things  other  than  
goodness  is  not  free.    The  version  of  this  idea  that  shows  up  in  the  contemporary  analytic  free  
will  debate  is  the  view  that  an  agent  enjoys  free  will  if  her  internal  psychological  desire-­‐‑
structure  meets  certain  self-­‐‑reflexive  standards.    Frankfurt,  for  a  classic  example,  holds  that  an  
agent  has  free  will  –  in  virtue  of  which  she  is  an  agent  and  not  what  Frankfurt  calls  a  “wanton”  
–  insofar  as  she  is  able  to  “have  the  will  [she]  wants.”xli    Frankfurt  expresses  the  idea  terms  of  a  
postulated  hierarchy  of  desires:  to  act  freely  is  to  do  that  which  is  consistent  with  one’s  2nd-­‐‑order  
desires  concerning  the  content  of  one’s  first-­‐‑order  desires.    Gary  Watson  refers  to  Plato  
explicitly.xlii    Watson  contends  that  there  is  nothing  special  about  numerically  higher-­‐‑order  
desires  in  specifying  the  nature  of  free  will.    The  issue  is  qualitative,  he  says.    One  acts  freely  
when  one’s  actions  are  consistent  with  one’s  values,  rather  than  with  one’s  desires  (if  these  
motivational  systems  should  conflict).    As  in  all  areas  of  the  literature,  there  are  of  course  many,  
many  examples  of  this  type  of  approach;  I’ve  cited  just  two  that  are  well  known.    What  becomes  
of  a  concern  with  psychic  harmony  from  a  dispositional  realist  perspective?    On  the  one  hand:  
nothing.    While  the  powers  theorist  may  be  at  an  advantage  in  that  she  can  talk  in  a  realist  way  
about  psychic  forces  or  drives  should  she  wish  to,  she  will  not  be  led  by  her  metaphysics  to  
weigh  in  on  the  internal  workings  of  the  self.    On  the  other  hand:  something,  and  for  just  the  
same  reason.    From  a  powers  perspective,  none  of  these  considerations  pertain  to  the  definition  
of  free  will.    To  have  free  will,  the  dispositional  realist  will  think,  is  to  be  the  bearer  of  a  certain  
kind  of  causal  power,  viz.,  the  power  to  intentionally  undertake  to  express  one’s  other  powers.    
Whether  or  not  this  sort  of  power  exists  (i.e,  whether  or  not  there  is  free  will)  is  a  different  
matter  altogether  from  what  one  does  with  it,  or  whether  or  not  one  experiences  the  potential  
psychological  turmoil  unfortunately  made  possible  by  the  having  of  it.      
  
(7)    Freedom  
   John  Stuart  Mill  opens  On  Liberty  with  the  stipulation  that  “[t]he  subject  of  this  Essay  is  
not  the  so-­‐‑called  Liberty  of  the  Will  so  unfortunately  opposed  to  the  misnamed  doctrine  of  
Philosophical  Necessity;  but  Civil,  or  Social  Liberty.”xliii    I  have  argued  elsewhere  that  in  fact  it  is  
not  possible  to  draw  a  neat  line  between  social  and  political  philosophy  and  metaphysics.xliv    
Still,  Mill  is  right  that  the  free  will  question  and  the  social-­‐‑political  freedom  question  have  
different  objects.    The  metaphysical  question  concerns  the  fate  of  agency,  given  the  fact  of  causal  
determination.    What  we  post-­‐‑Aristotelians  really  want  to  know,  if  we’re  honest  about  it,  is  
whether  or  not  agency  as  we  experience  it  is  actually  possible  in  the  face  of  causation,  once  the  
latter  has  been  conceived  in  terms  of  a  coercive  nomological  order,  rather  than  in  terms  of  
activity.    The  social-­‐‑political  question,  by  contrast,  has  to  do  with  a  particular  kind  of  situation  
in  which  powerful  particulars  who  are  endowed  with  agential  powers  may  or  may  not  find  
themselves.    One  aspect  of  the  social-­‐‑political  question  involves  specifying  the  features  of  the  
circumstances  in  question.    What  are  the  essential  characteristics  of  a  historical  context  that  
would  qualify  it  to  be  counted  as  free?    Or,  if  one  prefers,  to  be  counted  as  allowing  for  the  
freedom  of  agents  located  therein?    Some  contend  that  it  is  absence  of  impediment.    Others  
maintain  that  it  is  the  ability  of  those  in  such  an  environment  to  realize  personal  and/or  
collective  aspirations.    Isaiah  Berlin,  who  may  or  may  not  have  accurately  portrayed  Mill’s  own  
position,  gives  us  the  terms  “negative”  and  “positive”  liberty,  respectively,  to  pick  out  these  
alternatives  as  general  types  of  response.    The  other  aspect  of  the  social-­‐‑political  question  is  
whether  or  not  freedom  at  this  level  presupposes  any  other  social-­‐‑political  state(s)  of  affairs  as  a  
condition  of  its  possibility  –  or  any  psychological  one(s),  for  that  matter.    Answers  tend  to  vary  
directly:  the  more  robust  the  conception  of  freedom,  the  more  will  be  thought  to  be  required  in  
order  for  it  to  obtain.    Indeed,  one  who  already  held  a  positive  conception  of  freedom  might  
think  that  what  I’ve  parsed  as  requisites  are  not  pre-­‐‑conditions  at  all,  but  simply  additional  
constitutive  features.          
   The  metaphysical  question  and  the  social-­‐‑political  question(s)  are  indeed  related,  
though,  even  if  they  are  not  the  same.    At  a  minimum,  any  account  of  freedom  at  the  social-­‐‑
political  level  will  presuppose  the  metaphysics  necessary  to  sustain  it.    Some  combinations  of  
social-­‐‑political  theory  and  metaphysics  will  be  ruled  out.    Others  will  be  logically  possible,  but  
lack  coherence.    The  proponent  of  negative  liberty,  for  example,  has  various  options.    She  could  
be  a  (standard)  determinist:    the  fixed  order  of  the  world,  she  would  say,  just  happens  to  
include  both  a  given  agent’s  deterministically  caused  desire  for  x,  and  the  fact  of  there  being  no  
impediment  to  her  pursuing  it.    She  could  also  be  a  standard  compatibilist,  though  if  she  were  
the  sort  of  compatibilist  who  maintains  that  metaphysical  freedom  just  is  the  absence  of  
constraint  relative  to  the  pursuit  of  desired  ends,  she  would  have  to  say  that  agents  who  lack  
the  freedom  to  do  as  they  like  are  thereby  stripped  of  free  will.xlv    Or  she  could  be  a  
metaphysical  libertarian,  insisting  that  it  is  only  metaphysically  unconstrained  agents  who  
stand  to  enjoy  social-­‐‑political  freedom  as  she  has  defined  it.    Certainly,  one  can  easily  imagine  
the  negative  political  libertarian  judging  a  deterministic  causal  order  to  be  an  impediment.    But  
other  possible  combinations  make  less  sense.    The  concept  of  positive  liberty  does  not  logically  
preclude  a  commitment  to  (standard)  hard  determinism  or  to  (standard)  compatibilism,  but  of  
the  available  Humean-­‐‑inflected  positions,  it  sits  most  comfortably  with  standard  metaphysical  
libertarianism.    Just  as  she  rejects  the  idea  that  one  is  free  regardless  of  how  limited  one’s  
opportunities  are  (so  long  as  nothing  stands  in  one’s  way),  a  proponent  of  positive  liberty  will  
be  unlikely  to  think  that  an  agent  may  be  counted  as  genuinely  self-­‐‑determining  if  she  is  free  to  
do  and  to  desire  only  that  which  has  been  determined  for  her  by  laws  of  nature  and  antecedent  
conditions.  
   The  question  for  my  present  purposes  is  whether  or  not  any  of  this  changes  if  one  
adopts  a  powers  ontology.    As  before,  the  answer  is  yes  and  no.    On  the  one  hand,  a  powers-­‐‑
based  metaphysics  entails  neither  a  negative  nor  a  positive  conception  of  freedom.    In  principle,  
the  powers  theorist  can  adopt  either  position.    On  the  other  hand,  entailment  is  not  the  only  test.    
If  we  think  comprehensively  about  the  dispositional  realist  approach,  including  that  which  it  
throws  into  relief,  a  number  of  implications  follow  as  a  matter  of  good  sense,  if  not  logic.    One  
point  to  appreciate  is  that  both  the  event-­‐‑causal  compatibilist  and  the  event-­‐‑causal  libertarian  
are  primed  to  conceive  of  political  freedom  in  negative  terms,  even  if  they  are  not  compelled  to  
do  so.    The  compatibilist  will  find  it  easy  to  think  that  there  is  no  need  for  her  to  embellish  upon  
her  metaphysical  conception:  to  be  free  is  to  be  not-­‐‑coerced,  period.    The  libertarian,  meanwhile,  
has  already  gone  a  step  further.    In  her  view,  to  be  metaphysically  free  is  to  be  not-­‐‑even-­‐‑
coerced-­‐‑by-­‐‑causation.    And  for  her  too  it  will  be  easy  to  retain  the  core  idea  thereof,  viz.,  that  
freedom  is  tantamount  to  lack  of  impediment.    A  non-­‐‑powers  perspective  thus  inclines  its  
proponents  towards  negative  conception  of  liberty,  even  though  it  does  not  require  it.      
   Second,  we’ve  seen  that  the  dispositional  realist  conceives  of  causation  as  a  matter  of  
things  displaying  their  powers.    What  will  be  of  interest  with  respect  to  human  beings,  from  this  
perspective  –  whether  or  not  we  call  it  freedom  –  is  the  exercising  of  our  own  powers,  including  
our  uniquely  self-­‐‑reflexive  powers.    Now,  as  I’ve  said,  the  dispositional  realist  is  not  required  to  
believe  that  any  such  power  or  powers  exist.    It  is  open  to  her  to  be  a  (powers-­‐‑based)  physicalist  
and/or  a  (powers-­‐‑based)  p-­‐‑determinist.    But  if  she  does  believe  that  human  beings  have  agential  
powers  –  a  capacity  for  self-­‐‑conscious  self-­‐‑determination,  we  might  say  –  then  any  discussion  
that  it  would  make  sense  to  call  a  discussion  of  freedom  will  likely  center  on  the  cultivation  and  
expression  thereof.    And  will  the  dispositional  realist  be  in  a  position  to  say  something  different  
about  a  human  capacity  for  self-­‐‑conscious  self-­‐‑determination  than  the  non-­‐‑powers  theorist?    
Yes.    At  the  most  basic  level,  the  capacity  in  question  (followers  of  Nussbaum  might  use  the  
term  “capability”)  will  be  thought  to  be  a  real  power  or  cluster  of  powers,  something  that,  in  
virtue  of  its  reality,  really  can  be  either  fostered  or  thwarted.    By  contrast,  unless  she  is  an  agent-­‐‑
causalist,  the  non-­‐‑powers  theorist  will  hold  that  what  appears  to  be  a  “power”  is  in  fact  a  
sequence  of  states  of  affairs.    Moreover,  as  argued  in  section  2,  such  real  powers  will  be  un-­‐‑
problematically  attributable  to  agents  as  their  own.    Finally,  and  perhaps  most  notable,  the  
contrast  between  positive  and  negative  liberty  will  not  be  a  sharp  one,  from  this  perspective.    In  
fact,  we  might  say  that  it,  too,  is  sublated.    In  both  the  positive  and  the  negative  models,  what  is  
of  interest  is  the  efficacy  of  the  agent.    The  disagreement  concerns  only  the  placement  of  a  
particular  normative  marker  –  a  bar  that  distinguishes  “mere”  human  efficacy  from  human  
flourishing.    Should  it  be  set  low,  at  the  absence  of  constraint?    Or  higher,  so  as  to  take  in  
enabling  conditions  and/or  the  achievement  of  any  specified  outcome(s)?    Thus,  while  it  is  true  
that  a  defense  of  free  will  and  an  account  of  social-­‐‑political  freedom  are  responses  to  different  
questions,  the  dispositional  realist,  unlike  the  non-­‐‑powers  thinker,  will  regard  discussions  of  
socio-­‐‑political  freedom  as  tracking  the  same  power  of  self-­‐‑determination  that  gives  content  to  
metaphysical  freedom.  
   I  argued  early  on  that  a  powers-­‐‑based  metaphysics  sublates  the  determinism  side  of  the  
free  will  problematic  by  re-­‐‑casting  nomological  regularity  as  an  epiphenomenal  product  of  
powers  –  some  of  which  sustain  deterministic  laws,  others  of  which  sustain  only  probabilistic  
laws  and  still  others  of  which  arguably  produce  no  laws  at  all.    I  also  suggested  that  one  could  
already  see  how  such  an  ontology  might  sublate  the  entire  problematic.    Having  looked  now  at  
the  free  will  side,  we  may  add  that  realism  about  causal  powers  (a)  resolves  important  problems  
faced  by  event-­‐‑causal  defenders  of  free  will;  (b)  reveals  a  range  of  non-­‐‑causal  formulations  of  
free  will  to  be  digressions;  and  (c)  simultaneously  (i)  clarifies  the  difference  between  the  concept  
of  free  will  and  that  of  social-­‐‑political  freedom;  and  (ii)  blurs  the  distinction  between  positive  
and  negative  liberty  by  connecting  both  to  the  power(s)  of  self-­‐‑determination.    But  we  are  also  
better  able  now  to  appreciate  the  way  in  which  adopting  a  dispositional  realist  stance  radically  
reconfigures  the  debate  as  a  whole.    To  reiterate  what  I  said  at  the  close  of  part  1,  it’s  not  just  
that  some  powers  generate  an  appearance  of  determinism  but  others  don’t.    It’s  also  that  free  
will,  from  this  perspective,  just  is  causal  determination:  the  greater  the  degree  of  causal  
determination  (by  the  agent),  the  greater  the  degree  of  freedom.      
  
(iii)    Conclusion:  Powers  and  Agent-­‐‑Causation  
   All  proponents  of  agent-­‐‑causation  are  in  a  position  to  say  at  least  some  of  the  things  
about  agency  that  the  dispositional  realist  can  say.    It  will  be  important,  therefore,  by  way  of  
conclusion,  to  identify  the  specific  epistemic  gain  associated  with  a  comprehensive  powers-­‐‑
based  approach.    But  let  me  be  clear  about  what  I  mean  to  count  as  an  agent-­‐‑causal  view.    I  do  
not  mean  a  view  such  as  that  proposed  by  Laura  Ekstrom,  for  example,  who  holds  that  “the  
agent-­‐‑causation  of  an  intention  is  …  an  ontologically  and  conceptually  reducible  notion.”xlvi    
Ekstrom  summarizes  her  position  as  follows:    
Theory  Type  3d  (T-­‐‑3d  Theories):  An  action  is  free  only  if  it  results,  by  a  
normal  causal  process,  from  a  pertinent  intention  (e.g.,  an  intention  to  
perform  that  act  here  and  now)  that  is  caused  by  the  agent,  where  this  latter  
term  (‘caused  by  the  agent’)  is  reducible  to  event-­‐‑causal  terms.xlvii  
  
We  are  presented  here  with  italicized  talk  of  agents  doing  the  causing,  but  given  her  default  
neo-­‐‑Humean  understanding  of  “normal  causal  process,”  and  given  her  explicit  equation  of  
agent-­‐‑causation  with  event-­‐‑causation,  we  can  see  that  Ekstrom’s  thesis  is  actually  this:  an  action  
is  free  only  if  it  results,  via  an  event  causal  process,  from  a  pertinent  intention  that  is  itself  the  
result  of  an  event-­‐‑causal  process.    The  example  is  instructive,  though.    When  I  observe  that  the  
proponent  of  an  otherwise-­‐‑Humean  agent-­‐‑causal  account  is  able  to  say  much  of  what  the  
dispositional  realist  can  say,  I  have  in  mind  the  kind  of  position  associated  with  Roderick  
Chisholm,  for  example  –  one  in  which  it  is  assumed  both  (a)  that  agents  are  substances;  and  (b)  
that  agents  are  productive  causes;  but  also  (c)  that  in  all  other  situations,  causation  consists  of  
regular  sequences  of  event  rather  than  in  the  display  of  real  powers  borne  by  substances.    This  
“hybrid”  model,  as  I  shall  call  it,  is  the  one  that  is  tacitly  assumed  by  those  who  reject  agent-­‐‑
causation  on  the  grounds  that  it  posits  a  mysterious,  “not-­‐‑normal”  kind  of  causation,  
supposedly  operating  along-­‐‑side  the  regular,  Humean  kind.  
   The  question,  then,  is:  how  does  the  hybrid  model  of  agent-­‐‑causation  compare  to  a  
comprehensive  powers-­‐‑based  model?    Exactly  which  lines  of  argument  open  to  the  
dispositional  realist  are  available  to  the  neo-­‐‑Humean  who  makes  an  exception  for  agents?    
Clearly  there  is  some  overlap.    Especially,  if  it  is  true  that  agent-­‐‑causation  resolves  issues  of  
control,  source-­‐‑hood  and  the  like,  than  any  agent-­‐‑causalist  will  be  better  able  to  handle  the  
whole  set  of  traction  problems  than  will  the  event-­‐‑causal  libertarian.    It  will  be  enough  to  think  
that  agents,  at  any  rate,  have  real  causal  powers  –  even  if  nothing  else  does.    As  soon  as  one  
undertakes  to  defend  such  powers,  though,  the  hybrid  agent-­‐‑causalist’s  underlying  neo-­‐‑
Humean  metaphysics  will  matter.    I  have  argued  elsewhere  that  a  loosely  Aristotelian  powers-­‐‑
based  metaphysics  allows  one  to  meet  the  challenge  to  non-­‐‑reductive  physicalism  posed  by  
Jaegwon  Kim,  in  particular  the  problem  of  over-­‐‑determination  that  follows  if  one  grants  the  
causal  closure  of  the  physical.xlviii    It’s  a  challenge  that  really  does  have  to  be  met  by  any  
proponent  of  agent-­‐‑causation,  because  if  the  mental  powers  attributed  to  agents  turn  out  to  be  
redundant  vis-­‐‑à-­‐‑vis  law-­‐‑governed  sequences  of  physical  states,  then  we  are  back  to  event-­‐‑
causation.    The  non-­‐‑dualist,  hylomorphic  ontology  that  permits  a  response  to  Kim  involves  
more  than  a  comprehensive  commitment  to  powers,  and  I  won’t  reproduce  my  argument  here,  
but  the  upshot  is  that  a  dispositional  realist  metaphysics  can  help  to  establish  the  existence  of  
conscious  physical  substances  such  as  human  agents:  integrated  entities  that  escape  Kim’s  
conceptual  net.    The  hybrid  agent-­‐‑causalist  can  assert  that  agents  are  efficacious,  but  because  
she  is  a  Humean  except  with  respect  to  agency,  she  is  not  optimally  equipped  to  call  into  
question  Kim’s  over-­‐‑all  apparatus.      
   A  similar  case  can  be  made  that  the  event-­‐‑causal  Humean  who  makes  an  allowance  for  
agent-­‐‑causation  will  be  at  a  disadvantage  in  responding  to  someone  such  as  Randolph  Clarke.    
Clarke  argues  persuasively  that  event-­‐‑causal  libertarians  cannot  deal  with  control  and  luck  
issues,  but  he  rejects  agent-­‐‑causation  in  the  end  because  it  presumes  substance  causation.    
Consider  the  following  series  of  excerpts  from  “Alternatives  for  Libertarians”xlix:      
To  clarify,  suppose  we  take  for  granted  a  view  of  events  on  which  a  
typical  event  is  an  object’s  o’s  possessing  a  property  P  at  a  time  t  (Kim  
1976).    The  object  o  is  a  constituent  of  the  event,  as  are  the  property  P  and  
the  time  t.  …  Now  suppose  that  properties  are  what  ground  casual  
powers.    Suppose  that  some  property  P  grounds  a  power  to  cause  an  
effect  of  a  certain  sort.    Imagine  that  a  certain  substance  s  comes  to  
possess  P,  and  that  until  s  acquires  P  the  chance  of  the  effect  in  question  is  
very  low.    The  occurrence  of  the  event  s’s  acquiring  P,  or  the  obtaining  of  
the  state  of  affairs  s’s  possessing  P,  will  typically  raise  the  chance  of  the  
effect’s  subsequence  occurrence.    There  is  nothing  of  this  sort  left  for  the  
substance  s  to  do;  the  event  or  state  of  affairs  takes  care  of  it!l    
  
Take  the  idea  that  an  object’s  possessing  a  property  at  a  time  constitutes  an  event.    And  for  
heuristic  purposes,  let’s  think  about  it  from  the  perspective  of  Brian  Ellis.    Ellis  has  recently  
come  to  the  view  that  substances  are  themselves  a  species  of  process  (a  revision  not  relevant  
here),  but  he  has  heretofore  endorsed  an  ontology  comprised  of  three  different  kinds  of  
universal:  substance-­‐‑kinds;  event-­‐‑  or  process-­‐‑kinds;  and  property-­‐‑kinds.li    A  particular  event  is  
an  instance  of  a  dynamic  universal  (i.e.,  a  process-­‐‑kind).    But  dynamic  universals  are  themselves  
natural  kinds  of  causal  displays.    Events  are  thus  irreducibly  active;  they  are  “doings,”  
essentially  constituted  by  expressions  of  real  causal  powers.    That  a  substance  may  have  this  or  
that  property  p  at  time  t  (or  at  all  times,  if  it  is  an  essential  or  even  just  persistent  property  of  the  
substance)  is  not  itself  an  event,  from  this  perspective;  it’s  just  a  fact  about  that  substance.lii  
   Let’s  continue.    “Now  suppose,”  says  Clarke,  “that  properties  are  what  ground  casual  
powers.    Suppose  that  some  property  P  grounds  a  power  to  cause  an  effect  of  a  certain  sort.”    
Here  let’s  invoke  Mumford.    Properties  just  are  causal  powers,  as  Mumford  has  it.    From  a  
dispositional  realist  perspective,  then,  Clarke  is  asking  us  to  suppose  the  existence  of  a  power,  
R.    (I  use  R  rather  than  P  because  the  powers  theorist  will  not  necessarily  agree  that  a  power  
must  be  grounded  by  some  further  property,  and  it  is  the  power  that  we  are  tracking.)  So  far  so  
good.    Next  comes:  “Imagine  that  a  certain  substance  s  comes  to  possess  P,  and  that  until  s  
acquires  P  the  chance  of  the  effect  in  question  is  very  low.”    Now,  if  one  thinks  that  all  
properties  are  powers,  and  if  one  thinks  that  substances  have  identity  conditions,  then  one  will  
think  that  at  least  some  of  the  powers  had  by  substances  are  had  by  them  essentially.    Clarke’s  
power  R  is  not  essential  to  s’s  being  s,  or  s  would  already  have  it.    Thus,  from  a  dispositional  
realist  perspective,  what  we  are  being  asked  to  imagine  is  that  substance  s  has  acquired  a  new,  
non-­‐‑essential  power.    Finally:  “The  occurrence  of  the  event  s’s  acquiring  P,  or  the  obtaining  of  
the  state  of  affairs  s’s  possessing  P,  will  typically  raise  the  chance  of  the  effect’s  subsequence  
occurrence.”    From  which  Clarke  concludes:  “There  is  nothing  of  this  sort  left  for  the  substance  
s  to  do;  the  even  or  state  of  affairs  takes  care  of  it!”    I  am  not  going  to  enter  into  the  debate  
between  dispositional  realists  and  Humeans  about  what  causation  is,  or  how  it  works.    But  even  
from  the  sidelines  we  can  see  that  Clarke’s  argument  for  event-­‐‑causation  presumes  event-­‐‑
causation  from  the  outset.    Insofar  as  s’s  acquiring  a  (non-­‐‑essential)  power  R  makes  it  be  more  
likely  that  the  sort  of  outcome  caused  by  the  display  or  manifestation  of  R  will  happen,  a  
substance-­‐‑causal  powers  theorist  will  not  explain  the  situation  in  the  way  that  Clarke  does.    In  
fact,  her  conclusion  will  be  precisely  the  opposite  of  his.    She  will  not  conclude  that  there  is  
nothing  left  for  substance  s  to  do.    Rather,  she  will  conclude  that  s,  having  gained  an  additional  
power  R,  is  now  even  more  causally  efficacious  than  it  was  before.    Of  course,  the  fact  that  the  
powers  theorist  will  say  this  does  not  settle  the  dispute  about  the  nature  of  causation.    But  it  
shows  that  Clarke  has  not  settled  it  either.    He  has  simply  asserted  that  causation  is  as  the  event-­‐‑
causalist  believes  it  to  be.    And  the  point  is  that  the  hybrid  agent-­‐‑causalist  is  not  in  a  position  to  
respond  to  such  an  assertion,  since  she  too  believes  that  causation  as  such  is  event-­‐‑causal.    I  
should  add  that  there  is  also  an  advantage  had  by  the  powers  theorist  that  is  not  subtle  at  all.    
Specifically,  the  otherwise-­‐‑Humean  agent-­‐‑causal  theorist  is  clearly  vulnerable  to  the  objection  
noted  above  regarding  the  introduction  of  a  second,  non-­‐‑standard  type  of  causality  that  applies  
only  to  agents.    Clarke  raises  this  objection  along  with  the  one  I’ve  been  discussing,  and  he  is  
hardly  alone  in  doing  so.    The  dispositional  realist  avoids  the  problem  altogether.    She  claims  
only  that  many  different  kinds  of  substance  exist,  bearing  many  different  kinds  of  causal  
power(s).liii  
   Above  all,  the  hybrid  model  leaves  the  free  will  problematic  intact,  whereas  a  
comprehensive  powers-­‐‑based  ontology  stands  to  both  (a)  make  true  and  (b)  reveal  as  partial  all  
of  the  global  claims  that  figure  therein.    As  we  saw  in  part  1,  dispositional  realism  sustains  what  
is  true  about  determinism  and  indeterminism  alike.    When  we  add  in  the  analysis  of  part  2,  we  
see  exactly  how,  in  addition  to  underwriting  agent-­‐‑causation,  a  powers-­‐‑based  ontology  also  
sustains  what  is  true  about  compatibilism  (viz.,  that  agency  is  not  at  odds  with  causation)  and  
what  is  true  about  libertarianism  (viz.,  that  agents  with  free  will  have  the  ability  to  initiate  
causal  processes).    If  this  set  of  deliverances  doesn’t  amount  to  a  reconfiguration  the  free  will  
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